This paper proposes to critically situate the social-developmentalist current of the last decade within the broader moment of finance-dominated accumulation regime, wherein, crucially, credit and access to financial markets have become the core motifs for the new mass-consumption market society. This structural move is, from our point of view, radically distinct from the very framework which inspired the tenets of early structuralist thought and which prevailed during the Keynesian post-war period. Today, highly segmented credit loans, private insurance, and other new financial products such as payment protection insurance have synthesized into indispensable elements for growth. In this new financialized framework, social policy has been used to underwrite a financial inclusion model that sowed the seeds of its own demise-while it enabled Brazil's transition into a society of mass consumption, it also deepened the indebtedness of households, partially transforming social insurance and welfare benefits into financial rents.
Introduction 1
The magic of finance is its ability to take by giving, to spread growth while denying to those who might partake of it the very wealth it puts in view (Martin 2002: 16) .
Economists and scholars have largely celebrated the path of economic growth in Brazil at the turn of the millennium, marked as it was by the expansion of the domestic market and the incorporation of millions of new low-income consumers into the formal economy. In this process, the scope and scale of the Brazilian market society grew rapidly, radically, and definitively. This trend signaled Brazil's transition into a new mass consumption society -a true novelty relative to the previous era of robust economic development in the 1970s, which tended to favor the middle and upper-middle classes
predominantly.
This new model -social developmentalism -combined economic recovery with real gains in average earnings, massive job creation, as well as inequality and poverty reduction. In theory, the proposed cycle of growth would follow the Keynesian paradigm of development, which long predicted that as wages rise, a resulting expansion of consumption would promote demand growth, investment, an increase in productivity levels, and stimulate innovation -fueling a positive feedback loop of growth. 2 This trajectory, it was argued, would raise wages and strengthen the redistribution of income, which would henceforth promote a more socially inclusive development path in Brazil.
And yet, in prioritizing the domestic market as the central engine for development, this model lost steam, trapped in a spiral within which investment and productivity gains failed to materialize according to expectations. What is more, the critiques and queries within the social developmentalist framework are done in a circular fashion, without aggregating, it would seem, elements that have been constantly disregarded in the formulation and implementation of the "hybrid politics" (Morais & Saad-Filho 2011: 525) that guided the new strategy of development.
1 I thank Ana Carolina Cordilha, MA student in Economics, for her valuable assistance in obtaining the data and in the elaboration of the figures. Special thanks are due to Prof. Alfredo Saad-Filho, colleague at the SOAS -University of London, who introduced a highly interesting bibliography on international financialization trends, which proved worthwhile. Besides, he also provided very useful remarks. I am also grateful to Prof. Luiz Fernando de Paula for his valuable comments to a previous manuscript and especially to Eudes Lopes with whom many ideas developed in this paper have been discussed in depth.
Curiously, social developmentalist economists neglected to place a fundamental dimension of this new framework in the foreground: credit -notably, consumer credit.
Indeed, social developmentalists are likely to consider credit as a mere input (albeit a highly relevant one), and as a "voluntary exchange of equivalents between two consenting parties", but not as a core motif for Brazil's transition into a society of mass consumption, wherein, according to Susanne Soederberg, "class-based power and exploitation are less visible and less politicized than in [the previous eras of] wagelabor/employment relation" (Soederberg 2014: 4) .
It is perhaps no surprise then that Brazil became an exemplary case study of the financial inclusion framework for low-and middle-income consumers, especially for those who still hold precarious jobs and/or cope with poverty. This is a widespread global trend, This paper proposes to critically situate the social developmentalist current of the last decade within the broader moment of finance-dominated accumulation regime (Stockhammer 2007) , wherein, crucially, credit and access to financial markets have become the core motifs for the new mass-consumption market society. This structural move -while celebrated by some -is, from our point of view, radically distinct from the very framework which inspired the tenets of early structuralist thought and which prevailed during the Keynesian post-war period. Today, highly segmented credit loans, private insurance, and other new financial products such as payment protection insurance 4 have been synthesized into indispensable elements for growth. Social policy has, in turn, been retooled so as to capture a pool that far outnumbers the rich and the very rich -notably, the poor, the vulnerable, and the lower working class. Here, credit is meant to bridge the gap between consumer demand and market supply in order to foment consumption and to ensure wellbeing through re-commodification. This trend has spread quickly. By the end of 2015, the level of household indebtedness stood at 48%, as compared to 18.42% in early 2005 (BCB 2015). Meanwhile, nominal interest rates in Brazil remain extremely costly, especially for consumption goods, which even 3 Susanne Soederberg's paper (2013) and book (2014) brilliantly trace how financial inclusion has become a universal issue, driven by the G20 and other multilateral agencies.
in the short term range from 30% to more than 140% per year (ANEFAC 2016) for personal loans, and continue to move up.
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In the new financialized framework, social policy was used to underwrite a financial inclusion model that sowed the seeds of its own demise -while it enabled Brazil's transition into a society of mass consumption, it also deepened the indebtedness of households, partially transforming social insurance and welfare benefits into financial rents. Worse, this debt promises to grow quickly under the fiscal adjustment period currently under implementation, which has been wracked by a sharp increase in interest rates as entitlements and social welfare rights are curtailed for the sake of austerity (Lavinas 2015b ). High levels of household indebtedness may delay attempts to foment a new period of economic recovery, particularly in a context in which social policy is pro-cyclical rather than counter-cyclical.
This paper proceeds as follows:
First, I explain the social developmentalist model and the limits it faces as it not only overlooks the structure of social spending -a non-inconsequential trait -but also the patterned ways in which financialization reversed the original structuralist framework.
Second, I explain the fundamental limitations of the instrumentalization of the social domain for political and economic purposes via the use of social policy as collateral for access to the financial sector. I argue that this new social model advanced a new wave of mass-consumption via a financialization framework.
Here, the logic of social protection was overturned: instead of guaranteeing security against periods of economic volatility, this framework deepened the scope and impact of cyclical trends. Ultimately, I show that deeper levels of indebtedness of Brazilian households -and not only further redistribution of income -fomented the recent transition.
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Finally, I explain that while social developmentalism marked such a structural move to a society of mass consumption, it did not unveil a broader structural shift that would overcome social and productive heterogeneity. In short, I suggest that the "social 5 In March 2013, the annual nominal interest rate in the retail sector for personal loans was 60.10%, skyrocketing to 92.29% in January 2016. Annual average interest rates in both periods for consumer credit were, respectively, 87.97% and 142.74% (ANEFAC 2016).
6 Despite a positive trajectory of real increases, average earnings in Brazil remain relatively low (R$ 2,000 is the average monthly labor earnings in December 2014, or less than USD 700). It is worth recalling that 84% of all 21 million formal jobs created in the period 2003-2014 have monthly wages that are less than two times the minimum wage (or approximately USD 525) (see PNAD, IBGE 2015b).
developmentalist state" was the principal guarantor of the collateralization of social policy in one of the world's most consequential emerging markets.
The Financialization Trap
In Brazil, the turn of the 21 st century brought with it not only the unveiling of the new millennium, but also a promise that after two decades of tepid growth (2% annually, according to BCB 2015), persistent economic instability, high inflation (until 1994) 7 , and unemployment (see PNAD, IBGE 2015b), a sustainable trajectory of development would be forged, henceforth bound to the expansion of a domestic market of mass consumption. This shift -from a "domestic market with concentrated wealth and income" (Bielschowsky & Mussi 2013 : 163) to a modern market societywould be structurally substantial and have lasting effects.
Needless to say, the perennial concern with the lack of scale of the domestic market, whose expansion was inhibited by factors of a structural kind, had long been key to seminal structuralist thought, in addition to having been the kernel of its catching up From this perspective, the core impediment to the expansion of market societies resided (above all else) in the absence of mechanisms for boosting consumption in the context of low productivity and of persistent over-supply of labor (Pinto 1970 Bielschowsky -one of its pioneers -in numerous pieces outlining the three "expansion fronts" that would be spurred on by demand to promote long-term development: (1) mass consumption, (2) natural resources, and (3) infrastructure (Bielschowsky 2012 ).
The premise for the success of such a strategy was framed in line with the Keynesian paradigm, on the one hand, which treats investment as a precondition for the expansion of effective demand, and with a Kaldorian inflection, on the other, according to which innovation would follow investment boosted by increases in demand. It is important to note that little if nothing has been said about the role of social policy in securing this growth model. If, in the Fordist regime, the social protection system was a pillar of the development of 20 th century capitalism, combining innovation and productivity gains with effective redistribution , 9 in the social developmentalist framework, wages and social spending hikes are mere inputs for fueling aggregate demand -not a cornerstone of the accumulation regime.
8 Throughout this article, we are in conversation with the social developmentalist current of economic thought -also termed "redistributive developmentalism guided by the state" (Bastos 2012) -and its focus on wage-led growth, which places the domestic market of mass consumption as the central engine for investment and industrial transformation. This growth model was favorable towards a particular articulation between social policy and political economy, the key object of our reflection.
9 Robert Boyer reminds us that the Fordist regime, which resulted in three decades of prosperity, heightened social justice and further equity, was bolstered by two central pillars: technicaltechnological progress and institutional innovations in the social-reproduction sphere. These key building blocks made (1) universal access to education and to high-skills training an achievement of democracy; (2) decommodified access to health care, housing and other goods and services a priority; and (3) the development of a progressive tax system with emphasis on the redistribution of individual wealth a strategic focus. These were foundational principles of welfare capitalism (Boyer 2015: 302 Likewise, Denise Gentil points out the limitations of the "income policy" due to a "fragmented and incomplete growth model, which shows a capacity for redistribution of income via social policies (including retirement benefits) of limited endurance" (Gentil 2013: 12) . From this perspective, macroeconomic policies failed to bolster investments and ultimately stymied the endogenous economic push that surfaced thanks to increased social spending in the domestic market.
Even Bielschowsky would come to concede to a lack of complementarity among the "three motors of investment" or "expansion fronts" in fomenting a new path for growth -a major flaw of the social developmentalist model, according to him (Bielschowsky 2012: 737) . Indeed, in a recent text which discusses the benefits and drawbacks of the three motors strategy, he warns that "for the model to work well in the long term […] the three motors of investment would need to be empowered by two engines: productive linkages and technological innovation" (Bielschowsky 2014: 28) . In sum, he attributes the resilience of structural rigidities in the Brazilian industry to the low investment rate of the manufacturing sector.
As is known, the awaited industrial 'catching up' did not materialize. The structural bottlenecks that plagued the productive sector persisted -exacerbated by decreasing levels of productivity only temporarily compensated by an expressive increase in imports of goods of all kinds (notably durable ones) fueled by an over-appreciated currency.
In his analysis of the recent evolution of consumption patterns in the Brazilian economy, Carlos Medeiros argues that at the domestic level, between 2003-2010, the sector that reported the highest number of increases (of a total of twenty-two sectors was the financial services industry (8.4% annual growth), followed closely by home appliances (7.8% annual growth). Yet, in comparing national consumption with imports, Medeiros found that the average annual growth rate of home appliance imports was much larger, in addition to having been the highest among all of the sectors studied, with 33.8% annual growth rate (Medeiros 2015: 119-120) . It is thus important to recognize that the expansionary effects of aggregate demand in stimulating productive activity were limited by the dynamic of imports in the economy, which restricted, also, the multiplier effects of increased social spending in the domestic economy.
I, however, express skepticism that the problem originated in a break from a sequence of steps or in the sudden derailment of an economic policy trajectory, which could be avoided had the "social developmentalist state" been more responsive in leveraging public investment as economic activity decelerated.
In what follows, I suggest that this reading is insufficient for two reasons: public and high quality health care, and public transportation), in addition to universal and free services designed to enable a more egalitarian mass consumption society that would strengthen demand and secure constant gains in the production of aggregate
value. Yet, the social developmentalist model was built around the predominance of social spending in the form of cash (3/4 of the federal social spending are cash). It embraced a liberal bias in the strategy adopted to combat poverty (Lavinas 2013a) and incentivized the commodification of education, health care, public transportation, and housing, against the backdrop of recurrent deficiencies in the provision of public goods in a regressive tax system, which ultimately concedes limitless incentives and There is no single concept of financialization, but rather a wide range of phenomena (Stockhammer 2007 ) that shapes this new accumulation regime. Many economists (Crotty 2014; Fine 2013; Sawyer 2013) hold that this phenomenon entails the reduction in the efficacy and in the overall levels of real investment and chronically weakens the growth of global aggregate demand in contemporary capitalism. As a result, increased profits do not translate into higher investment (Stockhammer 2007 ). According to these authors, the fall in productivity levels was a consequence of the deleterious impact that financial instruments and regulation have had on economic development.
With regard to the Brazilian case, Bruno et al. (2011) have been calling attention to the way financialization has inhibited the rise of the investment rate in the country for exacerbating the preference for liquidity by holders of capital, an insight in line with Keynesian thought. As a result, financialization also curbs and even obstructs economic growth in particular in developing countries for it is detrimental to the longterm immobilization of capital in the productive sector that is necessary for investments to mature. Regarding the Brazilian case, the authors show that after 1990, when the process of financial liberalization in the country started, investment rates and corporate profit rates that used to move altogether -at the same pace and in the same direction -for decades, took different paths: while the former drops and recovers very slowly, the latter shoots up, widening the gap between corporate profits and investment rates.
With this in mind, I might return to the contribution from José Carlos Braga (2013),
where he casts financialization as a systemic pattern of wealth, the impact of which goes far beyond sucking liquidity away from industrial to financial circulation. In his view, it comes to characterize the strategies of all the relevant private agents, with "interestbearing capital" 10 at its center, "whether it comes from large industrial or commercial corporations, banks, landowners, institutional investors, or personal financial savings" (Braga 2013: 90) . Thus, interest-bearing capital comes to organize not simply economic activity, whatever form it may take, but also takes in other aspects of the reproduction of life that had escaped the logic of the market under previous accumulation regimes. Now, the public provision of goods and services is not merely re-commodified, but also absorbed into the financial logic that places interest-bearing capital as the key to accessing well-being, and which in turn feeds the deepening indebtedness of ordinary families.
This shift has been underappreciated in the social developmentalist matrix, whose strategies were aligned in defense of a modus operandi in the name of development.
In reality, this approach overlooked the fact that without coming to terms with structural heterogeneity, the so-called material expansion or transition towards a society of mass consumption would only have emerged as a consequence of the access and scale that finance offers, despite slight improvements in income distribution.
In his exposition of the many facets of financialization, Ben Fine threads together many of the elements referenced above, but also details other dimensions of this phenomenon, such as the This idea is a legacy of the period of the dictatorship (starting in the 1960s), when repression of the workers' movement led several coopted unions to accept the first corporate coverage plans (Bahia 2015) . Since health service offerings were patchy, the growing working class, which was employed at large modern companies, called for Today the sector is highly concentrated, increasingly international, and publicly traded, having benefited from broadly favorable legislation.
Over the course of the privatization of healthcare services, major unions have played a crucial role. This explains why, for example, private healthcare became a part of work remuneration, a fixture in collective bargaining, often offering deficient and ineffective coverage that wound up resulting in considerable out-of-pocket spending for families.
This is a source of profound financial vulnerability: in the event of unemployment or a decrease in family income, the plan may even be abandoned.
At the moment, private healthcare coverage can only be obtained collectively, and is almost always mediated by organizations representing unions -which, in practice, often do not function as such. Evidently, specific legislation meant to encourage the broadening of private medical assistance has benefited from tax deductions for consumers and waivers for service and insurance providers.
Faced with the deteriorating State provision of healthcare, one falls back on the private sector. In the absence of income or savings to cover these unexpected expenses, the answer is to take out bank loans. By way of illustration, private healthcare spending has outstripped public (5.01% of GDP for the former, 4.6% for the latter) in a country that opted for a system inspired by the British National Health Service. Furthermore, with regards to education, the advance of private provision and the use of educational credit have outpaced the growth of public investment -which, in higher education, has stood out for the implementation of quotas for low-income students from public high schools (REUNI) and the creation of universities 15 in a number of regions.
Figures 1 and 2 demonstrate that throughout the last decade, in spite of being marked by slight increases in public spending in education, the share of public schooling declined in all deciles of the distribution, except for the top decile when it comes to college education. This shows that the better-off improved their participation in public and free universities, which are highly ranked and have minimal tuition costs. The general trend, nevertheless, affected elementary and middle schooling, in addition to higher education as household spending on education literally spread and deepened, burdening even low-wage groups.
15 A total of 14 federal universities were created. Meanwhile, the Program for the Restructuring and Expansion of Federal Universities (REUNI), sought to improve existing institutions and dramatically expand class sizes at public institutions.
Figure 1: Access to Public and Private Elementary and Middle Schools for Pupils and Students Ages 5-17 by Income Deciles (2003-2013).
Source: Own elaboration based on data from PNAD (IBGE 2015b).
Figure 2: Access to Public and Private Colleges or Universities, Students Ages

18-25 by Income Decile (2003-2013).
In terms of higher education, two simple indicators lay bare the ambiguities of an educational system that wound up stimulating private provision, in part through an 18 and debt amortization was extended to more than three times the length of one's studies, plus 12 months, with a grace period of 18 months. 16 PROUNI, or the University for All Program, created in 2004, awards full or partial (50%) scholarships to students from poor families and public high schools to study at private institutions -which, moreover, are tax-free. The key point here is that in terms of aggregate demand, the most important variable was household consumption. Its centrality stemmed not only from the elevation of salaries and labor income, but also from households' steep slide into debt. The core of this strategy was thus market incorporation via growth with debt, sidestepping persistent, divisive obstacles such as the country's productive and social heterogeneity (Lavinas and Simões 2015), the regressive nature of its tax system, and the paltry redistributive efficacy of social spending, given its failure to provide decommodified public goods. If we compare the rate of growth of total outstanding credit to the wage bill, we see that the former saw average annual growth of 13.8%, while the latter advanced 5% p.a.
during the period in question. Consumer credit, meanwhile, grew 11.5% p.a. The data speak for themselves. By way of confirmation, Borça Júnior and Guimarães (2015) conducted an ordinary least squares estimation and concluded that consumer credit was responsible for nearly 45% of the growth in household consumption and 1/3 of GDP growth in that period. This supports my hypotheses (Lavinas 2015a (Lavinas , 2015b (Lavinas , 2015c that, in addition to the bump in labor income and the reduction of wage dispersion, which spurred the growth of the domestic market and helped lay the foundation for a new phase of economic prosperity, credit and the financial system must be recognized as cornerstones of this new model for growth.
These consumer-credit-driven trends did not occur in a spontaneous manner, but rather This policy started as a direct initiative from labor unions that supported the new Workers' Party administration. At first, only civil servants could benefit, but soon thereafter this special credit line was extended to workers in the formal labor market, 25 While interest payments are mainly determined by monetary policies, principal risk and moral hazard are ultimately a consequence of information asymmetries (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981), a structural trait of credit markets.
26 Informality impeded the tracking of cash-flows in the past, encouraging lenders in the financial sector to raise interest rates to compensate for excessive losses from defaults.
before also reaching retired citizens and RGPS pension beneficiaries. 27 Here lies its innovative quality: consumer loans would now be pegged to social benefits (with the State as the guarantor), not just to earnings and wages. As a result, social policy was transformed, in particular in the case of pensioners into the collateral that was missing in this formula, which would be guaranteed by the state beyond labor income.
The extent to which income (whether in the form of wages or contributory benefits) could be compromised by debt would reach as high as 35% (as of 2015). Conversely, borrowers lose control of their income and also their debt. Repayments are withdrawn automatically from the debtor's wage or social benefit by creditors. This dynamic recalls Maurizio Lazzarato's concept of "the debt economy", according to which, debt proliferation is not only based upon the privatization of social insurance mechanisms and the individualization of social policies, but mainly "the drive to make social protections a function of business" (Lazzarato 2012: 29) . This is exactly what happens when the right to a social benefit is captured and transformed into debt, which, in turn, becomes the creditor's property. This kind of individualized creditor tutelage debt management is, in practice, the mortgaging of a right.
According to the Brazilian Central Bank (BCB 2015), in 2014, the distribution of borrowers with personal credit loans reflected a profile in line with the advantages offered by consigned credit: 62% of all loans went to civil servants, 31% to retirees, and only 7.5% involved regular workers from the formal private sector. This segmentation unveils the fact that these three groups of borrowers enjoy different loan conditions and interest rates, depending on the credit risk derived from their income and its origin. As a result, civil servants benefit more from lower interest rates than do formal workers who are charged slightly higher rates. This only reinforces the evidence of the State's direct role as a guarantor in credit risk mitigation. 30 Public bank.
31 In theory, it was predicted that the beneficiaries of Bolsa Família would be granted access to mortgage loans, life insurance, capitalization and savings. While savings accounts were in fact created, with 2.3% of family beneficiaries receiving this service, the rest of the financial inclusion mechanisms failed to reach more than 0.3% of these families by 2010. Ultimately, the adherence to the program would be very low (BCB 2011).
The Credit Market Boom throughout the 2000s
As of December of 2014, personal credit (households) corresponded to 26% of GDP or the equivalent of 48% of total outstanding credit operations (BCB 2015). Another aspect that should not be dismissed from the analysis is the cost of such financial inclusion -demonstrated in Figure 4 , with the evolution of interest rates relative to the inflation rate recorded by the IPCA index, also plotted in the graph (IPEADATA 2016 During that period, consumer credit comprised a small part of disposable family income (Trumbull 2013: 13) .
As shown in Trumbull (2013) Barr (2004) , disposable income is calculated by retracting from the total household income the expenses allocated for direct taxes and social contributions such as INSS. It does not take into account, however, the payment of services that should be public and whose supply is nevertheless private.
disposable income (post-taxes and transfers) would increase in France from 2% to 8.5%; from 6% to 12% in the UK and from 3% to 19% in Germany (Trumbull 2013: 13 Focusing exclusive on borrowers, the Brazilian Central Bank holds that on average their debt-to-income ratio reached 64% in 2014. This ratio worsens for borrowers whose household income ranks below three times the monthly minimum wage, for whom it climbs to 73% of disposable income (BCB 2015).
There is an important caveat worth noting here. Financialization should not be understood as an expression of a mere tendency of excessive, superfluous, and almost irrational consumption. Elizabeth Warren and Amelia Warren Tyagi in their classic "The Two Income Trap" (2003) upend the farce of such an overconsumption myth. According to them, the middle class and low-income sectors in the United States did not become over-indebted and insolvent as a result of morally questionable and unrestrained consumption, but rather due to the growing preeminence of debt for access to protection, opportunities and essential consumption goods. Indeed, it is this form of access to goods and services, and not just the magnitude of the process, which informs the financialization dynamic.
Conclusion
Broad financialization appears to have surfaced in Brazil out of the social developmentalist model, where the incorporation of new social groups into the mass consumption market and into the financial sector took form without a virtuous process of convergence -at once in the social domain and the productive sphere. Put simply, there was a structural move (mass consumption) without a structural shift (convergence). Consumption has been sustained through high-cost borrowing, growing indebtedness levels for households and the collateralization of social benefits, whereas public welfare provision deteriorated and the commodification of healthcare and education widened. This has been the hallmark of the so-called social developmentalist model, in which the role of the State in accelerating the twist to finance sounds unequivocal, particularly by tying social benefits to loans and therefore to "interest-bearing money" (Braga 2013: 90) .
Notwithstanding, most social developmentalists continue to focus their concern almost exclusively on a single dimension of this turn to financialization: the astronomical cost of the public debt, which directs part of the nation's wealth into the hands of financial and economic elites, away from the promotion of collective welfare.
The interpretations of the social developmentalist line seem to have a blinkered focus on the multiplier effects of the rising degree of monetization of families, without noting that the way in which the expansion of aggregate demand has fueled growth has broadened the process of commodification and financialization of social policies and strengthened the privativist bent of the social protection system in Brazil.
Further attention should thus be paid to the fact that social developmentalism neglected social policy in its totality which was instead deemed worthy merely for its function in "solving market failures". This was not an offhand choice, but a fundamental piece of the engine that would strengthen the financialization process, which, in unprecedented ways, came to include those previously excluded. This was possible via the use of social policy as collateral. Palley (2013) describes with nuance the contours of financialization as it materialized in the United States, where the stagnation of wages and the exacerbation of inequalities entwined. 34 In Brazil however, the appreciation of the minimum wage -a political price as put by Tavares (2015) and of average earnings, would follow a distinct trajectory, totally disconnected from productivity, which in fact was in decline. This is a marker of the advancement of financialization in Brazil, which of course demanded the rise of income levels, which are still very low, in order to give sustainability and stability to the financial innovations in course and the new logic of the finance-led capitalism momentum.
One of the paradoxes of the "hybrid politics" of the social developmentalist era was the democratization of access to financial instruments and as a result of consumption, rather than having advanced true social reform. The deconstitutionalization of the social security system unraveled and exacerbated over time, especially since 2012, with the massive tax-exemptions given to payroll across fifty-six sectors, in an unconditional and unlimited way. The compensation awarded to capital and to the better off, as well as to privatization in the form of tax expenses grew, worsening even further the regressive profile of the tax system. Robert Shiller's formula has been, it seems, applied to Brazil. The "democratization" of finance appears finally to have brought "the advantages enjoyed by the clients of Wall
Street to the customers of Walmart" (Shiller 2003: 1) . Yet from a normative perspective, should we endorse this chimera and the dangers it brings with it?
34 These included the over-valued dollar, trade deficits, inflation, manufacturing job losses, asset price (housing and equity) and rising household and corporate indebtedness.
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